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Abstract
Cooperation is essential for successful human societies. Thus, understanding how cooperative and selfish behaviors spread
from person to person is a topic of theoretical and practical importance. Previous laboratory experiments provide clear
evidence of social contagion in the domain of cooperation, both in fixed networks and in randomly shuffled networks, but
leave open the possibility of asymmetries in the spread of cooperative and selfish behaviors. Additionally, many real human
interaction structures are dynamic: we often have control over whom we interact with. Dynamic networks may differ
importantly in the goals and strategic considerations they promote, and thus the question of how cooperative and selfish
behaviors spread in dynamic networks remains open. Here, we address these questions with data from a social dilemma
laboratory experiment. We measure the contagion of both cooperative and selfish behavior over time across three different
network structures that vary in the extent to which they afford individuals control over their network ties. We find that in
relatively fixed networks, both cooperative and selfish behaviors are contagious. In contrast, in more dynamic networks,
selfish behavior is contagious, but cooperative behavior is not: subjects are fairly likely to switch to cooperation regardless
of the behavior of their neighbors. We hypothesize that this insensitivity to the behavior of neighbors in dynamic networks
is the result of subjects’ desire to attract new cooperative partners: even if many of one’s current neighbors are defectors, it
may still make sense to switch to cooperation. We further hypothesize that selfishness remains contagious in dynamic
networks because of the well-documented willingness of cooperators to retaliate against selfishness, even when doing so is
costly. These results shed light on the contagion of cooperative behavior in fixed and fluid networks, and have implications
for influence-based interventions aiming at increasing cooperative behavior.
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Introduction
Cooperation occurs when individuals pay costs to benefit others,
and this behavior is a central component of human societies [1–
14]. Evidence suggests that people are influenced by their social
contacts, and that, as a result, emotions, ideas, and behaviors can
spread across social network ties [15–28]. The question arises,
therefore, of whether cooperation also spreads via social conta-
gion. This question is theoretically interesting, and also has
practical applications for interventions designed to promote
cooperative behaviors.
Answering this question can be difficult, however, as contagion
is often hard to disentangle from homophily (the tendency for
people to form and maintain connections with similar others)
[23,29,30]. It is particularly hard to differentiate between
contagion and homophily using observational data, as homophily
may occur on unobserved traits for which conventional statistical
control is not possible in network analysis, as in all other
observational settings [30,31]. Controlled laboratory experiments,
however, address these concerns: in the lab, experimenters have
complete information about (and control over) the interaction
structure of their subjects.
Leveraging the power of laboratory experiments, a recent study
[32] demonstrated that social contagion does indeed occur in the
context of cooperation. We used data from a classic laboratory
experiment involving a public goods game (a game theoretic
formalization of group social dilemmas) to examine social
contagion of cooperation. In the experiment, subjects were
randomly assigned to interact with new groups of strangers in
each round, and chose how much money to contribute to a
common project that benefited all group members. By giving
subjects no control over their interaction partners, the possibility of
homophily was excluded. Nonetheless, subjects who were assigned
to groups of relatively high contributors made higher contributions
in subsequent rounds. This result provides clear evidence for the
contagion of contribution behavior in random networks with
anonymous strangers in a laboratory setting with no homophily.
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that behavior in cooperation games is also contagious in fixed
social networks, in which homophily is likewise excluded because
subjects are assigned to play with the same partners each round.
Across three similar experiments [33–35], subjects played multi-
player, repeated prisoner’s dilemma games in fixed networks of
various structures. In the prisoner’s dilemma, cooperation is
measured through a binary choice to cooperate or defect. Thus,
unlike in the public goods game, where cooperation is measured as
a continuous variable, these games allow one to separately
evaluate if cooperative and selfish behaviors are contagious.
Across all three experiments, cooperators who were paired with
relatively more defecting neighbors were more likely to switch to
defection in subsequent rounds; that is, selfish behavior was
contagious. However, cooperative behavior was not: defectors who
were paired with relatively more cooperative neighbors were not
more likely to switch to cooperation. These experiments provide
further evidence that social behavior in the context of cooperation
can spread from person to person, and extend this result to fixed
networks. They also suggest that there may be asymmetries in the
extent to which cooperative and selfish behaviors are contagious.
In these fixed network experiments, subjects were informed not
only of each of their neighbors’ decisions, but also of each
neighbor’s resulting total payoff. Given that defectors tended to
outperform cooperators, this payoff information may have
undermined the spread of cooperation: defectors with many
cooperative neighbors may have felt motivated to switch to
cooperation, but then have overridden this desire in the face of the
knowledge that switching would reduce their payoff. Thus, more
research is needed to determine if cooperative behavior may be
contagious in the absence of payoff information.
Furthermore, there is a need to explore the spread of
cooperation in dynamic rather than fixed networks. In many social
environments, humans have control over their interaction
partners, and are free to cut old ties and form new ones. A wider
range of strategies are available in such dynamic networks
compared to static networks. Thus, the strategic settings of fixed
and fluid networks may promote different approaches to
behavioral updating; that is, the contagion of cooperative and
selfish behaviors may operate very differently in fixed and fluid
networks. When humans interact repeatedly in relatively fixed
social networks, a primarily goal may be to balance the competing
desires of (i) successfully cooperating with others (as mutual
cooperation is preferable to mutual defection) and (ii) avoiding
exploitation by free-riders (as defecting with a defector is
preferable to cooperating with a defector). A common solution
to this dilemma is to use reactive strategies; that is, to respond to
the behavior of your interaction partners by cooperating when
they are cooperative and defecting when they are not. Thus, in
repeated cooperation games, people tend to either defect
unconditionally or play conditional strategies (such as Tit-for-tat
or Grim) [36–41]. For example, consider Tit-for-tat, a strategy for
repeated games in which a player chooses the option her opponent
chose in the previous round [2]. Humans may implement these
conditional strategies by mimicking their neighbors’ behavior over
time. On this basis, we predict that cooperative and selfish
behaviors should be contagious in relatively fixed social networks.
In contrast, in fluid social networks, another goal exists:
attracting new cooperative interaction partners. If individuals
(correctly) believe that they are more likely to form connections
with cooperators when they themselves cooperate, they may be
motivated to try cooperation even when their current interaction
partners are relatively uncooperative. Thus, we might predict less
of a relationship between the behavior of one’s current neighbors
and one’s own future behavior in rapidly updating social networks
where there is a sizable opportunity to attract new cooperative
partners.
Here, we test these predictions empirically by asking how the
spread of cooperative and selfish behaviors in social networks
depends on the extent to which individuals have control over their
network connections. We explore this issue using data from a
controlled laboratory experiment examining binary group coop-
eration decisions in repeated games. In this experiment, networks
varied in the extent to which individuals had control over their
network connections. This dataset provides complete information
about the history of network connections, allowing us to take a
longitudinal approach to isolate social contagion across time even
when homophily (based on network updating) is actually possible.
Additionally, in this experiment, participants did not receive
information about their neighbors’ payoffs each round, removing
this potential confound for studying contagion. We use this dataset
to ask how cooperative and selfish behaviors spread over time in
social networks with different rules guiding their structural
evolution.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
This research was approved by the committee on the use of
human subjects in research of Harvard University. Written
informed consent was obtained from all subjects.
Procedure
To examine contagion of cooperation in networks in which
individuals have more or less control over their network
connections, we take advantage of a dataset from a previously
published experiment on cooperation in dynamic social networks
[42]. In this study, subjects recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk [43–48] engaged in a stochastically repeated social dilemma
on a social network in groups averaging 20 people in size. At the
beginning of each session, subjects were assigned to positions on
social networks, with 20% of possible links between players formed
at random. Then, in each round, subjects chose between
cooperating, which entailed paying 50 points per neighbor for
each neighbor to receive 100 points, or defecting, which entailed
paying no costs and generating no benefits for any neighbors.
Before making their decisions, subjects were reminded of their
total number of neighbors, and (in all rounds other than the first)
they were also reminded of the decisions of each neighbor in the
previous round. After making their decisions, subjects were
informed of their resulting payoff and the decisions of each of
their neighbors. At the end of every round, there was a 0.8
probability of playing another round, and a 0.2 probability of the
experiment ending. An important feature of this design is that
subjects made only a single binary choice of cooperation or
defection each round; subjects could not choose to selectively
cooperate with some neighbors but not others. Thus, subjects were
faced with a group cooperative dilemma similar to a public goods
game [1].
The data from this study are of use to us because they allow us
to contrast behavior in networks in which individuals do and do
not have control over their network ties. In the fixed condition,
links were not updated; in all rounds, subjects played with the
same neighbors. Thus, in this condition, subjects had no control
over their neighbors.
In two other conditions, however, subjects had the opportunity
to alter their network connections. In the viscous condition, subjects
had a relatively limited ability to do so, and in the fluid condition,
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subjects chose to cooperate or defect, 10% of subject pairs in the
viscous condition and 30% of pairs in the fluid condition were
randomly selected. Then, one randomly selected member of each
pair was informed of the other member’s behavior in the
preceding cooperation round and was offered the opportunity to
alter their connection with that individual. If a link did not already
exist between the pair, the subject could form a new connection; if
a link already existed between the pair, the subject could break the
existing connection. After each network update round, subjects
were informed of the total number of individuals that formed new
links with them and that broke existing links with them. Thus, this
updating process gave players in the viscous and fluid conditions
some level of control over their network connections and some
feedback about the effect of their behavior. The experiment also
featured a fourth random network control condition, but for
brevity we do not discuss it in this paper, as it does not add
external validity over previous work.
Previous analyses of our dataset revealed that dynamic networks
promote cooperation [42]. In the fixed and viscous network
conditions, cooperation significantly decreased over time, but in
the fluid network condition, cooperation remained robust and
stable over time (as quantified statistically by a significant
interaction between round number and a fluid condition indicator,
in a logistic regression predicting cooperation). As a result, in later
rounds, there was significantly more cooperation in the fluid than
the fixed and viscous conditions. These analyses reveal that giving
individuals control over their network connections promotes
cooperative behavior. Mechanistically, it was shown that, in the
fluid condition, cooperation was incentivized because cooperators
were more likely to form and maintain beneficial connections with
other cooperators. However, this incentive was insufficient to
promote cooperation in the viscous connection, where only 10%
of pairs per round could update their connections.
Additionally, previous analyses of our data set revealed that tie
structure in the fluid network equilibrated over time, as shown by
Figure 1 (reproduced from the Supplementary Information of ref
[42]). In particular, the probability of a network update
opportunity resulting in the formation of a new link declined over
time. Initially, updates were much more likely to result in the
formation of new links than the breaking of existing links.
Eventually, however, the network stabilized into a dynamic
equilibrium in which the most likely outcome was no update,
and new links were formed approximately as frequently as existing
links were broken (this equilibration occurred by round 5). Thus,
networks in the fluid condition started out dynamic, with players
frequently forming new connections, but grew less fluid over time,
in actuality, as the network equilibrated.
Analysis
In the current analyses, we examine social contagion by
measuring changes in behavior across time. We examine the
probability that an individual changed behavior between the
previous round and the current round, as a function of her
neighbors’ behavior in the previous round. We examine transitions
both from cooperation to defection, and from defection to
cooperation, and relate these transition probabilities to the fraction
of cooperating neighbors in the previous round. This approach to
measuring social contagion focuses on changes in behavior rather
than frequencies of the behaviors themselves, and was adapted
from previous work employing an infectious disease framework to
study social contagion [27,28]. Additionally, in light of the
observation that the fluid network becomes less dynamic over
time, we also look for changes in the contagion of cooperation and
defection as rounds progress.
To operationalize neighbors’ behavior, we consider neighbors
from the previous round, as well as, in the viscous and fluid
conditions, neighbors who were added after the previous round.
After subjects formed new links, they were informed of their new
neighbors’ behavior in the previous round. Thus, we should expect
subjects to respond to the previous behavior of both their previous
neighbors and their new neighbors.
Our analysis focuses on the percentage of a subject’s neighbors
that cooperated, rather than the absolute number of cooperating
and/or defecting neighbors (which are distinct measures due to
degree heterogeneity). We take this approach because of previous
evidence suggesting that percentage of cooperating neighbors is
the salient factor to subjects in cooperation experiments.
Specifically, in a repeated public goods game experiment,
reducing the accuracy of information subjects had about the
individual decisions of other players, while continuing to
accurately report the average cooperation level of the group,
had no significant effect on cooperation behavior [49]; thus it
seems that subjects attend to the average level of contribution (i.e.
frequency of cooperation), rather than the number of cooperating
neighbors.
Statistical Methodology
Our statistical analyses use logistic regression to predict
cooperation (0=D, 1=C) as the dependent variable, with the
percentage of cooperative neighbors in the previous round as the
independent variable. To examine the contagion of cooperation,
we restrict to subjects who defected in the previous round (thus
their cooperation decision in the current round indicates whether
they stayed with D or switched to C). To examine the contagion of
defection, we restrict to subjects who cooperated in the previous
round (thus their cooperation decision in the current round
indicates whether they stayed with C or switched to D).
We also include controls for round number, as cooperation may
tend to decrease over time, and the number of neighbors an
individual had in the previous round and in the current round, as
the cost of cooperation increases with the number of neighbors.
We use robust standard errors clustered on subject and
experimental session to account for the non-independence of
observations from the same subject or from subjects within the
same session. Our regressions that consider changes in contagion
over time also include interactions between percentage of
cooperative neighbors and round number. Additionally, our
regressions combining data from all three conditions include a
binary ‘dummy’ variable indicating membership in the fluid
condition (0=not fluid condition, 1=fluid condition). Because the
experiment was conducted online, some subjects dropped out
before their session ended; for these subjects, we analyzed all
decisions they made before dropping out.
Predictions
We predict that in the fixed and viscous conditions, subjects will
mimic their neighbors’ behavior in order enact conditional
cooperation strategies. Thus, cooperative and selfish behaviors
should be contagious in these conditions. In contrast, we predict
that when subjects in the fluid condition perceive the opportunity
to attract new cooperative neighbors, they will be motivated to
cooperate regardless of their neighbors’ behavior, resulting in a
deflated contagion of cooperative and selfish behavior. However,
this should only be true when the network is in its fluid phase (i.e.
when new links are formed frequently). Thus, we predict that
subjects in the fluid condition will be relatively insensitive to the
Contagion of Cooperation in Social Networks
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the network equilibrates) they will become more likely to imitate
the defection and cooperation of their neighbors.
Results
Contagion of Cooperation
We first consider the spread of prosocial behavior. Figure 2
shows, for each condition, the probability of switching from
defection to cooperation as a function of the percentage of
cooperating neighbors in the previous round, and Table 1 shows
the accompanying regressions. We find a significant positive
relationship between the probability of switching to cooperation
and the percentage of cooperating neighbors in each condition
individually, as well as collapsed across conditions (fixed
coeff=0.81, p=.015; viscous coeff=1.50, p=.024; fluid
coeff=1.48, p=.003; all conditions coeff=1.25, p,.0001;
Table 1 Columns 1 through 4). Thus, across all rounds of the
game, cooperation is contagious in all network structures:
individuals with a greater fraction of cooperating neighbors are
more likely to switch to cooperation themselves.
We now ask whether contagion changes over time in each
condition by considering the interaction between percentage of
cooperative neighbors and round number (Table 2). Doing so, we
find no significant interaction in the fixed or viscous conditions,
indicating that the spread of cooperative behavior remains
constant as rounds progress (fixed coeff=20.08, p=.576; viscous
coeff=0.11, p=.685; Table 2 Columns 1 and 2). However, we do
find a significant positive interaction in the fluid condition,
indicating that, as predicted, the contagion of cooperation grows
stronger as rounds progress in the fluid condition (coeff=0.40,
p=.025; Table 2 Column 3). To show that this difference between
conditions is significant, we perform a regression including data
from all conditions, predicting the probability of switching to
cooperation. We find a significant three-way interaction between a
fluid condition dummy, round number, and percent of cooperative
neighbors in the last round (coeff=0.43, p=.040; Table 2 Column
4). Thus, the contagion of cooperation increases significantly more
over time in the fluid condition than in the fixed and viscous
conditions.
Cooperation becomes Contagious in the Fluid Condition
as the Network Equilibrates
We now further investigate the emergence of cooperation
contagion in the fluid network demonstrated above. We return to
Figure 1. Fluid network updates over time. This figure shows the fraction of network update events in the fluid condition resulting in the
formation of a new tie, the breaking of an existing tie, or no change to the network.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066199.g001
Figure 2. The contagion of cooperation. This figure shows the
probability of switching from defection to cooperation as a function of
the percentage of neighbors that cooperated in the previous round, in
the (a) fixed (b) viscous and (c) fluid conditions. Dots depict the
percentage of individuals with the specified range of cooperating
neighbors that switched to cooperation, and dot size is proportional to
the number of observations. Error bars indicate standard error of the
mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066199.g002
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net coefficient ([fraction of C neighbors] + [fraction of C neighbors
6round interaction]) to ask in which round cooperation becomes
significantly contagious. We find that a marginally significant
effect emerges at round 4, and a significant effect emerges at round
5 (net coeff: round three p=.334, round four p=.072, round five
p=.002). Consistent with this finding, we see that cooperation is
not contagious when aggregating over rounds prior to 5
(Coeff=1.02, p=.297), but is contagious when aggregating over
rounds five and greater (Coeff=2.70, p,.0001). This result is
consistent with our prediction that contagion should only emerge
in the fluid condition once new links are no longer formed
frequently (i.e. when the network equilibrates): Figure 1 demon-
strates that around round five, the probability of a network update
resulting in the formation of a new link levels off and remains
relatively low for the duration of the experiment.
We now provide direct evidence for our proposed mechanism,
whereby the desire to attract new cooperative neighbors induces
players to switch to cooperation regardless of the play of their
current neighbors. Our proposed mechanism predicts that
contagion increases with round number because round number
provides a proxy for perceived ability to attract new cooperative
neighbors. If this is the case, then regardless of round number,
subjects should be more influenced by their neighbors when they
perceive that they have less ability to attract new cooperative
neighbors. A clear signal of the current fluidity of the network is
the number of new neighbors that an individual gained in the
previous round (both through connections others formed with the
player, and through connections that the player formed with
others). Thus, we predict a negative interaction between number
of new neighbors and fraction of cooperating neighbors when
predicting the probability of switching to cooperation: subjects’
decisions to switch to cooperation should be less influenced by
their neighbors’ previous behavior when more new connections
were formed.
To test this prediction, we create a ‘‘new connections’’ variable
indicating the number of new neighbors that an individual gained
in the previous round, either as a result of choosing to form a
connection with another player, or as a result of another player
choosing to form a connection with them. We regress the
probability of switching to C on the percentage of cooperative
neighbors in the previous round, the number of new connections
formed in the previous round, the interaction between these
variables, and controls for round number and number of
neighbors in the current and previous rounds. As predicted, we
find a significant negative interaction between the percentage of
cooperative neighbors and new connections formed,
coeff=20.59, p=.024, indicating that gaining more new connec-
tions makes a player’s probability of switching to cooperation
depend less on her neighbors’ behavior. This result is consistent
with our proposed mechanism, wherein individuals who perceive
the opportunity to form new connections in dynamic networks are
motivated to switch to cooperation, even when they are paired
with relatively uncooperative neighbors. (In contrast, we would not
expect a similar relationship to exist for the breaking of
connections; and indeed, we find no significant interaction
between the percentage of cooperative neighbors and number of
connections broken, coeff=0.09, p=.739.).
Thus, while cooperation is contagious across all rounds of the
fixed and viscous conditions, it is only contagious in later rounds of
the fluid condition. Contagion of cooperation appears to emerge
in later rounds of the fluid condition because, as time goes on, the
network grows more stable as the probability of forming new
connections declines. Therefore, in later rounds fluid networks
become functionally similar to fixed and viscous networks, both in
terms of the opportunity to form new connections and the
contagiousness of cooperation.
Contagion of Defection
We next consider the spread of selfishness. Figure 3 shows the
probability of switching from cooperation to defection as a
Table 1. The Probability of Switching to Cooperation regressed against % Cooperating Neighbors in Previous Round, without
Interactions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Viscous Fluid All conditions
% Cooperating Neighbors in Previous Round 0.807** 1.496** 1.479*** 1.251***
(0.332) (0.661) (0.502) (0.259)
Current Round Number 20.204*** 20.218*** 20.111 20.154***
(0.063) (0.045) (0.078) (0.037)
Number of Neighbors in Previous Round 21.113*** 0.272*** 0.238*** 0.241***
(0.356) (0.099) (0.089) (0.050)
Number of Neighbors in Current Round 1.038*** 20.171 20.248*** 20.244***
(0.364) (0.158) (0.063) (0.056)
Constant 20.290 21.545*** 21.312*** 21.107***
(0.393) (0.587) (0.319) (0.241)
Observations 414 297 299 1,012
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p,0.01,
**p,0.05,
*p,0.1.
This table shows the results from logistic regressions predicting the probability of cooperating in the current round, among individuals who defected in the previous
round (i.e. predicting the spread of cooperation). We report the coefficients and robust standard errors clustered on subject and session for each independent variable.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066199.t001
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round for each condition, and Table 3 shows the accompanying
regressions. We find a significant negative relationship between the
probability of switching to defection and the percentage of
cooperating neighbors in each condition individually, as well as
collapsed across conditions (fixed coeff=22.35, p,.0001; viscous
coeff=23.63, p,.0001; fluid coeff=22.55, p=.0001; all condi-
tions coeff=22.74, p,.0001; Table 3 Columns 1–4). Thus, across
all rounds of the game, defection is contagious in all network
structures: individuals with a greater fraction of defecting
neighbors (i.e. a smaller fraction of cooperating neighbors) are
more likely to switch to defection themselves.
When we consider the interaction between percentage of
cooperative and neighbors and round number (Table 4), we find
no significant interaction in the fixed or fluid conditions, indicating
that the spread of selfish behavior remains constant as rounds
progress (fixed coeff=20.24, p=.123; fluid coeff=20.48,
p=.184; Table 4 Columns 1 and 3). While we do find a significant
negative interaction in the viscous condition (coeff=21.10,
p=.0006; Table 4 Column 2), there are no qualitative changes
over time: examining the net coefficient shows that selfishness is
already significantly contagious in round 2 (the first round in
which contagion is possible, p=.009), and the interaction merely
indicates that the contagion of defection grows stronger as rounds
progress.
Thus, contrary to our predictions, we do not find that social
contagion of selfish behavior is attenuated in fluid networks.
Instead, we find that selfishness spreads from person to person
across all rounds of the experiment in all network structures. To
further validate this conclusion, we perform a regression including
data from all conditions, predicting the probability of switching to
defection. We find no three-way interaction between a fluid
condition dummy, round number, and percent of cooperative
neighbors in the last round (coeff=20.04, p=.915; Table 4
Column 4). Thus, in contrast to the contagion of cooperation, the
contagion of defection is not attenuated in early rounds of the fluid
condition.
Discussion
Here we have investigated the contagion of cooperative and
selfish behavior in social networks that varied in the extent to
which they allowed individuals to update their social network ties.
Using a controlled laboratory experiment, we examined changes
in behavior over time in fixed, viscous, and fluid networks. While
we found that cooperative behavior was consistently contagious in
the fixed and viscous network conditions, we found that
Table 2. The Probability of Switching to Cooperation regressed against % Cooperating Neighbors in Previous Round, with
Interactions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Viscous Fluid All conditions
% Cooperating Neighbors in Previous Round 1.167* 1.018 20.390 1.082*
(0.615) (1.637) (1.366) (0.615)
Current Round Number 20.168** 20.259*** 20.392*** 20.170***
(0.074) (0.089) (0.096) (0.056)
Number of Neighbors in Previous Round 21.120*** 0.262** 0.237*** 0.208***
(0.360) (0.113) (0.087) (0.059)
Number of Neighbors in Current Round 1.043*** 20.162 20.261*** 20.245***
(0.368) (0.171) (0.060) (0.055)
% Cooperating Neighbors * Round Number 20.078 0.111 0.402** 20.018
(0.139) (0.273) (0.179) (0.131)
Membership in the fluid condition 0.925
(0.743)
Fluid Condition 6% Cooperating Neighbors 21.494
(1.387)
Fluid Condition 6Round Number 20.207*
(0.112)
Fluid Condition 6% Cooperating Neighbors 6Round Number 0.425**
(0.207)
Constant 20.466 21.338** 0.076 20.811**
(0.583) (0.647) (0.922) (0.393)
Observations 414 297 299 1,012
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p,0.01,
**p,0.05,
*p,0.1.
This table shows the results from logistic regressions with interaction terms predicting the probability of cooperating in the current round, among individuals who
defected in the previous round (i.e. predicting the spread of cooperation). We report the coefficients and robust standard errors clustered on subject and session for
each independent variable, and include interactions between variables.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066199.t002
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network had equilibrated (i.e. reached a point where new links
were formed relatively infrequently). Furthermore, we showed
that, in the fluid condition, subjects who gained more new
neighbors in a given round were less influenced by the play of their
neighbors in the subsequent round. Finally, we found that
defection was robustly contagious across all rounds of all network
structures. Here, we discuss the implications of three aspects of
these results.
Our first key finding is that both cooperation and defection were
contagious in fixed networks. This result is partially inconsistent
with previous work, which found significant contagion of defection
but not cooperation in fixed networks [33–35]. This difference
may arise from differences in the game payoffs between our
experiment and previous studies. Alternatively, this difference may
result from the fact that, in previous experiments, subjects were
informed of their neighbors’ payoffs after each round as well as
their actions. As cooperators earned less than defectors, this payoff
information may have discouraged defectors paired with cooper-
ators from switching to cooperation, overwhelming their natural
inclination towards mimicry. Further investigation of this issue, for
example by manipulating payoff information and holding all other
variables constant, is an important direction for future research.
Regardless, our data suggest that cooperation can spread from
person to person in fixed social networks. This is consistent with
the finding that humans are influenced by their social contacts
across a wide range of social contexts [15–28], and has
implications for interventions designed to promote cooperative
and other prosocial behavior. In relatively fixed social networks,
such as workplaces or apartment buildings, it may be possible for
interventions to create cascades of cooperation: increasing
cooperation in some target individuals may spread through the
network.
Our second key finding is that when social networks afforded
the possibility of forming new connections with cooperators, as was
the case in early rounds of the fluid condition, the contagion of
Figure 3. The contagion of defection. This figure shows the
probability of switching from cooperation to defection as a function of
the percentage of neighbors that defected in the previous round, in the
(a) fixed (b) viscous and (c) fluid conditions. Dots depict the percentage
of individuals with the specified range of defecting neighbors that
switched to defection, and dot size is proportional to the number of
observations. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066199.g003
Table 3. The Probability of Switching to Defection regressed against % Cooperating Neighbors in Previous Round, without
Interactions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Viscous Fluid All conditions
% Cooperating Neighbors in Previous Round 22.349*** 23.631*** 22.549*** 22.740***
(0.408) (0.420) (0.629) (0.282)
Current Round Number 0.010 0.026 0.162*** 0.060
(0.034) (0.083) (0.041) (0.039)
Number of Neighbors in Previous Round 20.365 20.117 20.182*** 20.126**
(0.244) (0.113) (0.042) (0.049)
Number of Neighbors in Current Round 0.462** 0.047 0.115** 0.112***
(0.231) (0.104) (0.048) (0.035)
Constant 20.145 1.004** 0.026 0.154
(0.500) (0.512) (0.578) (0.238)
Observations 377 356 494 1,227
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p,0.01,
**p,0.05,
*p,0.1.
This table shows the results from logistic regressions predicting the probability of defecting in the current round, among individuals who cooperated in the previous
round (i.e. predicting the spread of defection). We report the coefficients and robust standard errors clustered on subject and session for each independent variable.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066199.t003
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fluid condition, subjects were relatively likely to switch from
defection to cooperation even when they were paired with
uncooperative neighbors. But when social networks did not afford
this possibility, as was the case in the fixed and viscous conditions
and in later rounds of the fluid condition, subjects reacted to their
neighbors, preferentially switching to cooperation when their
neighbors were relatively cooperative. We suggest that different
network structures create different strategic environments, and
thus lead to different strategies for updating our cooperative
behaviors in response to those around us: when networks are
dynamic, the need to attract cooperative interaction partners
suppresses the conditional cooperation strategies employed in
static networks, causing players to switch to cooperation regardless
of the play of their neighbors.
This finding also has implications for interventions aimed at
promoting prosocial behavior via social contagion. In the context
of any given application, our results highlight the importance of
considering the nature of the social network in question. If it is a
fairly fluid network, cooperation may not be contagious. Thus, it
may be more effective to attempt to reduce the spread of selfish
behavior than to try promoting the spread of cooperative
behavior. That is, interventions should aim to keep currently
cooperative people from switching to defection, rather than trying
to expose defectors to cooperators in an attempt to spread
cooperation. However, our results highlight that not all social
networks that have the potential to be fluid are actually fluid at any
given time. Dynamic networks can equilibrate, such that even
though individuals may have control over their interaction
partners, they do not actually wind up forming new connections
frequently. Our results suggest that contagion-based interventions
should treat such networks liked fixed networks, not fluid
networks. We also note that the lack of contagion of cooperation
in dynamic networks does not imply a lack of cooperation: On the
contrary, the lack of contagion means that subjects were likely to
switch to cooperation even when their neighbors were mostly
defecting.
Our third key finding is that unlike the contagion of
cooperation, the contagion of defection was not attenuated in
dynamic networks. Why might this be? If defectors in the fluid
condition are motivated to switch to cooperation to attract new
cooperative neighbors regardless of their neighbors’ behavior, then
why aren’t cooperators likewise motivated to continue cooperat-
ing, even when paired with uncooperative neighbors (as we
hypothesized in previous work [42])? It would seem that in early
rounds of the fluid condition, instead of mimicking the selfish
behavior of one’s neighbors, cooperators would do better to
continue cooperating and simply cut ties with defectors when
Table 4. The Probability of Switching to Defection regressed against % Cooperating Neighbors in Previous Round, with
Interactions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Viscous Fluid All conditions
% Cooperating Neighbors in Previous Round 21.405 0.425 20.669 21.225
(0.919) (1.254) (1.127) (0.765)
Current Round Number 0.090 0.563*** 0.494** 0.178**
(0.057) (0.104) (0.243) (0.079)
Number of Neighbors in Previous Round 20.371 20.111 20.186*** 20.146***
(0.240) (0.130) (0.044) (0.047)
Number of Neighbors in Current Round 0.464** 0.047 0.113** 0.113***
(0.225) (0.125) (0.046) (0.040)
% Cooperating Neighbors * Round Number 20.236 21.104*** 20.481 20.417**
(0.153) (0.321) (0.362) (0.164)
Membership in the fluid condition 21.028
(0.840)
Fluid Condition 6% Cooperating Neighbors 0.385
(1.398)
Fluid Condition 6Round Number 0.266
(0.248)
Fluid Condition 6% Cooperating Neighbors 6Round Number 20.041
(0.389)
Constant 20.486 21.140 21.229 20.236
(0.576) (0.889) (0.793) (0.459)
Observations 377 356 494 1,227
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p,0.01,
**p,0.05,
*p,0.1.
This table shows the results from logistic regressions with interaction terms predicting the probability of defecting in the current round, among individuals who
cooperated in the previous round (i.e. predicting the spread of defection). We report the coefficients and robust standard errors clustered on subject and session for
each independent variable, and include interactions between variables.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066199.t004
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positioned to attract new cooperative neighbors. However, our
data indicate that such cooperators instead switched to defection.
One possible explanation for the asymmetry between the
contagion of cooperation and defection comes from the finding
that humans have a strong taste for negative reciprocity [6,8,50–
52]. When we perceive that we have been treated unfairly, we are
often willing to incur costs to reciprocate the unfair treatment,
even when doing so reduces earnings and is thus non-strategic.
Negative reciprocity may play a stronger role in the contagion of
defection than the contagion of cooperation.
Cooperative players in our game can reciprocate defection
either by switching to defection themselves (behavioral reciproc-
ity), or, in the dynamic conditions, by severing their connection
with the defector (link reciprocity). Yet even in the fluid condition,
only 30% of network connections can be updated each round, and
only one member of each pair has control over network updating
at any given time. Because the ability to reciprocate by cutting ties
is thus limited, behavioral reciprocity may be more psychologically
satisfying than waiting for the chance to engage in link reciprocity
in the future. Thus, our strong preference for negative reciprocity
may contribute to the robust contagion of defection across network
structures. In contrast, individuals who have previously defected
may be less concerned with avoiding exploitation, and thus less
influenced by negative reciprocity motives. It may thus be
relatively easier to motivate these individuals to switch to
cooperation, even when their neighbors are relatively uncooper-
ative, if they perceive that doing so will attract new cooperative
neighbors. This asymmetry could help explain why dynamic
networks attenuated the contagion of cooperation, but not the
contagion of defection.
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